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Abstract In the Netherlands, new accountability arrangements are created as
remedies for the accountability deficit of agencies. These arrangements are of a
‘horizontal’ nature, as the agencies account for their behaviour towards accountees
that are not their hierarchical superiors: clients, stakeholders or peers. This paper
provides an inventory and qualitative assessment of horizontal accountability
arrangements. It is argued that they have added value because they stimulate
learning. However, horizontal accountability is not a substitute for hierarchical
accountability. Horizontal accountability arrangements operate ‘in the shadow of
hierarchy’: they gain significance through complex interactions with traditional
forms of accountability.
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In recent years, many public service organizations have been granted substantial
autonomy (see Van Thiel 2000; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002; Pollitt et al 2004).
The creation of agencies at arms length has caused widespread concern regarding
their accountability. Their partial autonomy limits the possibilities for ministerial
control. This has resulted in a much diagnosed ‘accountability deficit’ of arms-length
governance (see Van Thiel 2000: 167; Flinders 2001: 41; Mulgan 2003: 74; Pollitt
2003).
One of the possible remedies is to create new forms of accountability that
complement traditional, hierarchical accountability (see Barberis 1998; Braithwaite
1999, Flinders 2001). These forms of accountability are often of a ‘horizontal’ nature
(Scott 2000; Mulgan 2003; Bovens 2005). The adjective, horizontal, indicates an
important distinction from traditional forms of accountability, where a subordinate
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usually reports to a superior (hence these can be coined vertical forms of
accountability). Horizontal accountability arrangements address peers, equals,
stakeholders or concerns outside of the hierarchal relationship between central
government and executive agency.
Horizontal accountability is said to be a promising solution for the accountability-
problems of agencies. The growth in size and complexity of present-day public
administration has lead to a fragmented system of governance that is ill adapted to
hierarchical, Weberian models of accountability. As Scott (2000: 42) notes:
‘Constitutional lawyers almost universally agree that traditional accountability on
its own has become inadequate in present day public administration’. Critics have
called for an accountability regime that is more dispersed (Braithwaite 1999; Bovens
2005), features more mutual relations between accountors and accountees (Behn
2001; Roberts 2001) or relies on networks (Harlow and Rawlings 2007).
In the Netherlands, the more or less programmatic creation of agencies in the
1990’s was accompanied by policy-efforts to balance the loss of governmental
control with additional accountability arrangements. Important policy actors, such as
the Home department, the National Court of Audit and the Scientific Council for
Government policies, all underlined the importance of new and more horizontal
forms of accountability (Schillemans 2007). As a result, new accountability
arrangements have been created by many Dutch agencies.
This paper is concerned with an empirical analysis of a number of these new
accountability arrangements. The introduction of horizontal accountability poses at
least three empirical questions. The first question is what forms of horizontal
accountability are on the rise? The second question is what they actually contribute
to the accountability of agencies. This requires an empirical approach to the practices
of horizontal accountability. Can they be considered as extensions of traditional
accountability or do they have complementary contributions? And thirdly, how are
we to understand the role of new arrangements in the accountability regime of
agencies?
Horizontal accountability
In recent years, many authors have commented upon the complexity and manifold
meanings of accountability (Dubnick 2005; Sinclair 1995; Bovens 2005). The
academic literature features a variety of different conceptual approaches. However,
at a basic level of analysis, many authors agree upon a minimal definition. This section
will first provide a definition of accountability and then discuss under what conditions
accountability is considered to be horizontal. This leads to a number of criteria that
will be used to distinguish the horizontal accountability arrangements of Dutch
agencies. Also, attention will be given to the expected added value of horizontal
accountability.
Accountability defined
In a narrow sense, many authors understand accountability to be a communicative
interaction between an accountor (person or organization) and an accountee (see Pollitt
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2003: 89), in which the former’s behaviour (in the broadest sense of the word) is
evaluated and judged by the latter, in light of possible consequences (c.f. Day and
Klein 1987: 5; Romzek and Dubnick, 1998: 6; Scott 2000: 40; Mulgan 2003: 9).
Accountability then requires an actor with a duty to render an account and a second
actor with the authorization to judge and, usually, impose sanctions. In this sense,
accountability refers to answerability to someone for appropriate conduct and expected
performance. Accountability as it is understood here, refers to the processes by which
actors provide reasons for their actions against the backdrop of possible negative (or
positive) consequences (Dunn 1999: 335). Accountability implies that the accountor
explains and justifies his behaviour towards a significant other (see Orbuch 1997: 455;
Roberts 2001: 1551; Keohane 2002: 4; Dubnick 2005: 1).
The communicative interaction between accountor and accountee presupposes a
relationship. This relationship often exhibits formal as well as informal elements.
The accountee is usually in an authorized position to demand answers from the
accountor. Accountability is first of all based on a formalized relationship that
stipulates the rights, authorities and available sanctions of the accountee (see
Broadbent et al 1996: 269; Aucoin and Heintzman 2000: 54). The accountee has the
right to demand information, the duty to pass judgment and the opportunity to
sanction dissatisfactory conduct. This formalized relationship distinguishes account-
ability from the many other communicative relations of public agents with other
parties. In addition, however, there is usually also a subjective element to
accountability. As different authors note, the accountor feels obliged to render an
account of his conduct, behaviour and performance to the accountee (Lerner and
Tetlock 1999: 255; McCandless 2001: 22). The accountor acknowledges the position
of the accountee as his accountability-holder. In order to trace this subjective aspect
of accountability, scholars have often asked people in public administration to
indicate to whom they felt to be accountable (see Day and Klein 1987; Sinclair 1995;
Romzek and Dubnick 1998; D. Dunn 1999; Verschuere et al. 2006).
From an analytical perspective, processes of accountability normally involve three
phases (Mulgan 2003; Bovens 2005). In the first phase, the accountor renders an
account on his conduct and performance to a significant other. This may be coined
the information phase. In the second phase, accountor and accountee engage in a
debate on this account. The accountee may ask for additional information and pass
judgment on the behaviour of the accountor. The accountor will answer to questions
and if necessary justify and defend his course of action. This is the debating phase.
Finally, the accountee comes to a concluding judgment and decides whether and
how to make use of available sanctions. This is the sanctions or consequences phase.
Sanctions may vary from formal disapproval to tightened regulations, fines,
discharge of management or even the termination of the organization. Many authors
notice that there is a hierarchy of sanctions. As Hood et al (1999: 47) indicate: ‘It
emanates with the ‘ability to shame’, escalates to lighter weapons such as certificates
or formal (dis)approvals and culminates in the ‘nuclear weapon’ of liquidation’.
From a legal and institutional design perspective it is imperative that the accountee
has sufficient investigative and sanctioning powers. The literature on accountability
often focuses on the ‘heavier weapons’ amongst the formal sanctions and the
adoption of performance standards. This is enhanced by the fact that many authors
favour a principal-agent approach to accountability, in which controlling the agent
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(=accountor) is a crucial concern (see Przeworski et al. 1999; Strøm 2000;
Broadbent et al 1996; Besley and Ghatak 2003).
In addition to formal sanctions, informal consequences may also follow from
accountability. This was already implicit in the above quote from Hood et al (1999):
their hierarchy of sanctions started with ‘the ability to shame’. Negative publicity
may also be seen as a form of sanctioning, even though no formal retribution is used
(see also Harlow and Rawlings 2007: 545). Accountability arrangements can be
depicted on a scale, with strong mechanisms on the one extreme, where the
accountee is armed with the ‘nuclear weapon’ of liquidation’, and relatively weak
mechanisms on the other extreme, where the accountee may only ‘shame’ the
accountor in public, in front of his peers or before the eyes of a political principal.
It is not necessarily the case that stronger forms of accountability are more influential
than weaker forms, even though this would be a logical assumption. As Braithwaite
(1997) indicates: big sticks rebound. The application of heavy sanctions may have
negative implications for the accountee, invoke defensive reactions and perverse effects,
or, at the very least, put a strain on the relationship between accountor and accountee.
Conversely, authors have noted that relatively weak mechanisms can sometimes have
huge impacts on public organizations. One of the reasons is that the voice of a reputable
accountee may damage the reputation of the accountor if it appears in public (see
Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2003: 6). The impact of negative voice depends on
reputations and the saliency of the issue involved (see Lerner and Tetlock 1999: 258).
Managers of public agencies therefore often understand public evaluations as
accountability processes (see Mulgan 2003: 63). In addition, the voice of a reputable
accountee with limited sanctioning powers may alert and activate hierarchical
superiors. For ‘weak’ accountability arrangements to be effective in this sense, it is
necessary that the outcomes are published or presented to superiors or in important
policy networks. Or at least it is important that the accountee anticipates that this
might happen. In those instances, relatively powerless forms of accountability can
become influential because they operate ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf 1997).
As, as we will see, many horizontal accountability arrangements have limited formal
sanctioning powers—they are found at the weaker end of the scale—they are quite
dependent on published voice and voice in policy networks.
Horizontal accountability
Public administrations feature a wide variety of accountability arrangements.
Different authors have made different categorisations of accountability. Romzek
and Dubnick (1998) for instance distinguish between political, hierarchical,
professional and legal accountability; and Behn (2001) between accountability for
results, process and finances. In this paper, different accountability arrangements are
categorized on the basis of the type of relationship between the accountor and the
accountee. In traditional forms of accountability, a superior demands accountability
from a subordinate. This is based on the principle of ownership (Mulgan 2003: 12)
and is implicit in principal-agent approaches. Hence they can be understood as
vertical forms of accountability. In order to categorize as a case of horizontal
accountability, the accountee needs to be independent from both the agent and the
principal. There is not a full principal-agent relationship between accountor and
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accountee. For semi-autonomous agencies, independent evaluators, boards of
stakeholders or commissioners, journalists, interest groups and clients can all act
as horizontal accountees. This is often based on the principle of affected rights and
interests (Mulgan 2003: 13).
Numerous scholars have recently referred to horizontal accountability (Day and
Klein 1987: 28; Sinclair 1995: 223; Scott 2000: 42; Goetz and Jenkins 2001: 363;
Keohane 2002: 22; Mulgan 2003: 26; Bovens 2005). The concept is most strongly
associated with the research of O’Donnell (1998; 2003. See also Kenney 2003). His
conception of horizontal accountability is in the core similar to the one developed
here, but differs in its implications. In the core he also asserts that horizontal
accountability applies to non-hierarchical accountability. In its consequences,
O’Donnell’s research (see 1998: 117–9) deals with forms of accountability between
the different constitutional powers of the state. He is particularly concerned with the
question whether the legislative and the courts are in a position to effectively hold the
executive to account. This paper also looks at non-hierarchical accountability, but
looks at different accountors: O’Donnell focuses on the accountability of the
executive, this paper at agencies. From the perspective of agencies, accountability to
parliament would be a form of vertical accountability whereas it is horizontal in
O’Donnell’s perspective. Because of the similarity in the core of the argument this
paper has chosen to make use of ‘horizontal accountability’ above other available (but
narrower) concepts such as downward accountability (Verschuere et al 2006), citizen
accountability (Paul 1992) or societal accountability (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2003).
If we summarize the argument so far, we come to the following criteria for
horizontal accountability (Table 1). It is a purely analytical definition, that does not
address the rich normative debate on accountability (see for normative discussions
Romzek and Dubnick 1998; Behn 2001; Bovens et al 2008). The following elements
define horizontal accountability arrangements.
Substitutes or complements?
The sum of all accountability arrangements of one agent may be called its
accountability regime (Scott 2000: 55; Bovens et al 2008). The introduction of
Table 1 Elements of horizontal accountability
Elements
1. A relationship between an accountor and an accountee qualifies as a case of horizontal accountability
when it is
a. Formalized
b. Acknowledged by the accountor
c. The accountee is independent from the hierarchical principal(s) of the accountee and the accountor
2. The accountability process begins with the Information phase, where the accountor is obliged to explain
and justify his conduct;
3. after which the debating phase follows, in which the accountee poses questions, they engage in
dialogue, and the accountee passes judgment (“voice”).
4. Consequences: The accountor may face consequences through either
a. Formal sanctions, or
b. Informal consequences through published voice or voice in policy networks.
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horizontal accountability produces an accountability regime in which different
accountees demand accountability, even though the ministry is still the most
important. The prime evaluative question for additional arrangements is then how
their role is defined in contrast or addition to ministerial responsibility. The question
that needs to be answered is whether horizontal accountability is to be considered as
an extension of ministerial responsibility or whether it is complementary and adds
something new.
The literature tends to favour the second position. More specifically, authors have
claimed that accountability to all sorts of stakeholders can be beneficial particularly
from a learning perspective (Aucoin and Heintzman 2000; Behn 2001; Bovens et al
2008). Accountability creates feedback information with which public organisations
may learn how to improve their conduct. Accountability forces power-holders to
reflect upon their behaviour and this stimulates their learning capacities. ‘Learning’
in this respect means the ‘revision of cognitions and beliefs as a result of the
transformation or recoding of information based on the observation and interpreta-
tion of experience’ (Hemerijck and Visser 2003: 4–5). Horizontal accountability is
expected to produce feedback information on operations that is particularly
supportive of first order, or single loop, learning processes (Argyris and Schön
1978). Additional accountability arrangements contribute to learning if they:
& Information phase: richness of information
& Debating phase: critical reflection
& Consequences: ‘lessons’ that lead to policy changes (Bovens et al 2008; Aucoin
and Heintzman 2000: 52–54).
A minority of authors holds the opposite position that horizontal accountability
should be judged from the question whether it enhances democratic control on the
execution of public duties. This position implies that horizontal accountability is
regarded as an extension of the democratic chain of controls on bureaucracies (Strøm
2000). From this perspective, the major evaluative questions are:
& Information and debating phases: horizontal accountability is informative to
democratic accountees
& Consequences: horizontal accountability steers in a direction favoured by
democratic principals.
The contributions of horizontal accountability arrangements in the Netherlands
will now be assessed in order to investigate which of the above positions is most
appropriate. Before proceeding, however, the research design and methods will be
described in short.
On the research
The empirical research for this paper consists of the following steps. To begin with,
an inventory was made of all the institutional arrangements of a subset of 82 Dutch
agencies (see Schillemans 2007: 11–3 for selection). This lead to an inventory of 60
horizontal accountability arrangements (see Table 2).
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In the second step of the research, the accountability arrangements of 13 large
agencies (a subset of the 60) were studied through document analysis and interviews.
As accountability was defined as a communicative interaction between two parties,
the document analysis aimed to reconstruct the content of this communication. This
included an analysis of agenda’s and minutes of official meetings, the most
important official documents of the agencies, such as annual reports, strategic (mid
term) plans, audits and evaluations and, policy documents of the ministries, reports
and letters to parliament. Also unofficial minutes and documents were studied, when
found to exist. And via internet, media-searches were conducted in order to find
references to the horizontal accountability arrangements in press releases and media
articles.
In the third place interviews were held with managers and senior officials of the
agencies, members of executive boards, clients, other stakeholders and senior
officials of parent-departments. In total 90 interviews were held with 70 respondents.
The interviews were recorded and the verbatim text was typed. The reports of the
interviews were then searched for all quotes that referred to the defining criteria of
horizontal accountability (see Table 1), the influence on policy decisions and
comments that refer to learning. The content, outcomes and influence of
communicative interactions between accountors and accountees could thus be
reconstructed.
Table 2 Overview of accountability arrangements and research
Boards of
stakeholders
Boards of
commissioners
Evaluation
(“visitation”)
Boards of
experts
Ombudsmen
Total
number of
agencies
16 14 11 5 14
Studied in
research?
Yes No
Studied
agencies
Accreditation Organisation of The Netherlands and Flanders
(NVAO); Agency for student grants (IBG); Air Traffic Control
(LVNL); Authority on vehicles (RDW); Cadastre and Public
Registers Agency (Kadaster); Central Funding of Institutions
Agency (CFI); Centre for Work and Income (CWI); Forest
Authority (Staatsbosbeheer); Netherlands Forensic Institute
(NFI); Netherlands Vaccine Institute (NVI); Pension and
Benefit Board (PUR); Social Security Agency (UWV);
Statistics Netherlands (CBS)
Legal basis Law (1 covenant) Law Covenant
Focus Quality of output and
outcome
Good governance General
strategy/
external
strategy
Frequency
of contact
Appr. 4 times a year 4–7 meetings a year Once every
4 years
Types of
agencies
Executive agencies; three in
domain social security;
two with partly scientific
tasks.
Executive agencies;
some of them
operate close to
markets.
Executive
agencies;
relatively
large
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Following these steps, reconstructions have been made of the practices of
horizontal accountability, and the impact of the mechanisms on agencies. Influence
was acknowledged to exist when two independent respondents together with
‘evidence’ from formal documents, such as minutes of meetings, pointed to the same
policy decision that was influenced by horizontal accountability.
The analysis allows for conclusions on specific arrangements, specific agencies or
clusters of them. The descriptions hereafter will focus on overall conclusions, which
was possible because the research found many remarkable similarities. The empirical
part of this paper will now subsequently treat the three empirical questions of this
paper: which horizontal accountability arrangements?, what contributions do they
have in practice?, and how are we to understand their role in the accountability
regime of agencies?
Horizontal accountability arrangements
Which mechanisms of horizontal accountability can be found at Dutch agencies?
The criteria for horizontal accountability outlined above have been applied at the
different external relations of a subset of 82 Dutch agencies. In total, 60 individual
mechanisms were found. Grossly speaking five different mechanisms can be
distinguished. First of all, boards of stakeholders (16 agencies). These boards are
usually made up of organizations that represent individual or corporate clients. In
some instances they represent real citizens that are affected by the policies of the
agency. Secondly, boards of commissioners (14). These boards are made up of
members with a wealth of experience in the policy area of the agency. They are
appointed by the ministry but they do not have to account for their oversight (or lack
thereof) to the minister. Thirdly, boards of experts (5). These boards are all found at
agencies with complex, professional tasks, mostly in specialized research. Fourthly,
there are forms of horizontal accountability to independent evaluation committees
(‘visitation’ - 11). The focus of the evaluations is responsiveness to clients and the
overall external strategies of agencies. The evaluation reports are always published
and also sent to the minister and members of parliament. Finally there are agencies
with a special ombudsman or independent complaints office (14).
The above mechanisms were all found to fulfil the criteria of our definition of
horizontal accountability.
Criterion 1a points to the formalization of the relationship between accountor
(agency) and accountee. The three different types of boards all have a legal basis.
Most of them are instituted in the laws that establish and regulate the (relative)
autonomy of the agencies. The same applies to most of the ombudsmen and
independent complaint offices. The independent evaluations (visitations), however,
have a basis in a covenant between likeminded agencies. The different regulations
stipulate, in many different ways, that the accountees have the task to keep a
watchful eye on the strategic policy decisions of agencies. They are to operate as a
check on the discretion of agencies by monitoring their behavior from the
perspectives of stakeholders (stakeholder councils; “visitations”), expert knowledge
(boards of experts), good governance (boards of commissioners) or due process
(ombudsmen). In order to fulfill their role, the different accountees are entitled to all
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the information they require for their task (right to information). In some cases (some
boards of commissioners), they have access to all documents, offices, and personnel
in order to justify their need for information. Also, they are to meet with the
management of the agency on a regular basis to discuss its conduct (debating phase).
And they are expected to pass judgment on the conduct of the agencies. This
judgment is published in public documents and is made available to political
principals; their ‘voice’ thus appears in public and in important policy networks.
With the exception of the boards of commissioners, these arrangements have only
limited sanctioning powers. This means that the different ‘horizontal accountees’ can
not enforce their will upon the agencies. In order to influence the (future) decisions
of the agencies, they mostly have to rely on the persuasive qualities of their voice or
they can hope that their voice works through the shadow of hierarchy. Their position
as accountees is based on a) legal status, b) duty to give judgment on all strategic
policy choices, c) public character of their judgements (criterion 4b) and d) personal
networks with important external policy actors, such as ministers, political parties,
ministries or issue organisations (criterion 4b).
Criterion 1b stresses the informal and social aspects of accountability relation-
ships. During the research, all interviewed managers and senior staff were asked in
open questions whether or not they felt to have an obligation to account for their
conduct to the boards and in the evaluation process. Around 85% of the respondents
felt that ‘accountability’ was indeed a part their relationship. However, the
respondents also indicated that it was a form of accountability that differed in
nature from vertical accountability towards the ministry. Explicitly or implicitly they
then referred to the fact that the horizontal mechanisms mostly lack strong corrective
measures. As one respondent noted “We provide information and reasons for our
choices. But there is less of a need to defend ourselves”.
Criterion 1c stresses that accountees must be independent from ministry as well
as agency in order to be seen as ‘horizontal’. Formally, this is the case for all of the
mechanisms. The members of the boards stand outside of the principal–agent
relationship. The laws clearly indicate that they are to act “without seeking or
accepting instructions”. They have a personal responsibility for their role, something
which for instance is accentuated for some boards, where the members bear a
personal liability for their choices. Normally, boards select members through
cooptation and they thus decide on their own memberships (even though this often
needs the approval of the minister). In practice however, independence is a more
complex issue. For one thing, the members of boards are recruited from policy
networks where they are bound to know and encounter the minister or senior
departmental civil servants. In addition, the different accountees need support from
the agencies in order to attain the information they need. They are therefore assisted
by secretariats with employees from the agency. This may in practice compromise
their independence. As one of the secretaries of a board notes: “It is a complex issue,
sometimes. I work for the board, but there are of course people within the agency
who are my bosses”. So in practice, independence is checked by policy networks
(recruitment) on the one side and information demands (secretariats) that tie
accountees to the accountors on the other. Individual members therefore indicate that
they have to maneuver between personal integrity, solidarity with the agency and
affinity with the minister and the parent department.
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The other criteria of horizontal accountability apply to the practices of the
accountability processes. This will be treated in the next section of this paper.
Horizontal accountability-in-action
Three of the aforementioned types of horizontal accountability will be covered in
this section: boards of commissioners, boards of stakeholders and ‘visitations’
(independent evaluations). The rationale for this selection is that they were found to
operate in many similar ways—even though there are numerous formal differences.
Also, they stand for three quarters of the total number of mechanisms that were
found. The analysis is based on the practices that were reconstructed in the
qualitative analysis. The ‘story’ is organized according to the criteria from our
definition: the information phase (criterion 2), the debating phase (criterion 3) and
the consequences (criterion 4a and 4b).
Criterion 2: information phase
The information phase of horizontal accountability processes generally focuses on
major strategic policy issues, such as budgets, tariffs, quality standards and political
developments in the field. The different accountees are mostly informed about the
conduct of the agencies through the same documents that are also presented to the
principal. These documents generally cover the most important strategic aspects of
the activities of agencies. Documents such as annual reports, mid-term strategic
plans and all documents about services are discussed with the ministry, board of
commissioners, board of stakeholders, and they are embodied in the visitation
procedure. The minutes of meetings show that the different boards comment and
give advise on documents such as mid term strategic plans, plans to reorganize the
organization, the annual report, new tariffs, and relevant legal and political
developments.
The (re-)use of the same information in different accountability processes is
generally considered as a positive feature, or at least as something very practical. As
one respondent notes: ‘It is true that we discuss the same documents with the
ministry, the board of commissioners and the board of stakeholders. Luckily, I
should add. Otherwise it would be an enormous task providing all the information’.
Most respondents indicate that the topics that are covered in the information
phase can be loosely divided into two categories. One respondent indicates that the
‘inner world’ of the general strategy of the agency is the first important issue. This
also regards issues such as communication with customers and quality standards.
The second major issue is, according to the same respondent, the ‘outer world’ of
relationships with political principals and societal stakeholders. This last finding is a
little surprising, as they formally have to contribute to the quality of services and
stability of the agencies (the inner world). In practice however, all of these horizontal
accountees display a keen interest in the politico-strategic issues of the outer world
with which the agencies have to deal. Boards therefore demand to be informed about
all major external and political developments.
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It is important to note that there is a more or less supply-driven information
provision in the information phase that distinguishes horizontal accountability from
traditional forms of vertical accountability. In vertical accountability, agencies have
to provide government, inspection services, Ombudsmen, Auditor-General and
judges with all the information they require. The exchange of information is usually
driven by the demands of the accountees. In horizontal arrangements, the accountees
take more passive stance. They concentrate on the “drill of the annual planning and
control cycle”, as one respondent noted. The accountees are more dependent on the
information that is provided to them because they usually have less time at their
disposal and have limited knowledge of what information is available. There is an
information-asymmetry between accountor and accountee that stems from the fact
that the organisation of course knows a lot more about its own operations than the
accountees do. When asked, none of the members of the different boards found this
problematic. They were convinced that they received all the information they
needed, because they fostered friendly relationships with the managers of the
agencies.
Criterion 3: debating phase
In the debating phase of horizontal accountability, the dialogue between accountors
and accountees generally covers the most important aspects of the ‘inner world’ and
‘outer world’ of the agencies. Most respondents describe the tone of their dialogue as
‘cordial’ and ‘friendly’. All accountees have the dual task of assisting and advising
the organisation on future action and evaluating past performance. In practice, the
former issue often prevails. Accountees do not concentrate their scrutiny on breaches
of performance standards. Rather, their focus is reflective and aimed at future
improvements. As different respondents indicate, accountees tend to ask: ‘what can
we learn from this?’ And another respondent adds: ‘We prefer to operate in the realm
where actions are still to be taken’.
When asked, most respondents describe the role of the different boards and
visitations in terms that clearly suggest’reflection’. ‘Their role in practice is to look
ahead’, one observer notes. Others add that they operate as ‘sparring partners’ to
management over major strategic issues, that they abound in posing ‘difficult
questions’ on new policy decisions and that their role is to ‘enhance critical
reflection’.
This cooperative and reflective mode of operation is enhanced by the interests of
both parties. Members of boards and visitation committees have to deal with
information-asymmetry. The agencies are large bureaucracies with hundreds or
thousands of employees. They perform complex tasks in often turbulent political
contexts. Members of boards and visitation committees simply do not have the time
to penetrate into all of the issues involved. Self-estimations of invested time run
from 50 to a 100 available annual hours. In addition, they are supported by a small
staff of employees of the agency. In this context, a reflective and cooperative mode
of operation is rational. Some members of boards reflect upon this openly. They
indicate that the quality of the relationship also has strategic benefits, because: “you
simply receive more information” and: “we attain more this way”.
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Fostering a more or less cooperative accountability relationship is also beneficial
to the other party: the managers of the agencies. They indicate that the different
members of the boards are all connected to relevant outside constituencies. Members
of boards are sometimes seen as interlocutors to the minister, they have networks in
important bureaucratic circles or they are connected to the strongest societal
organisations and pressure groups. It is in part against this background that managers
explicitly indicate that is important to develop a positive relationship in horizontal
accountability. They indicate that this could ‘enhance their reputation’ and that the
members of boards may ‘serve as ambassadors to our cause’.
However, irrespective of the motives of accountors and accountees for developing
a cooperative and reflective relationship, this reflection-enhancing role strengthens a
bond of trust between accountor and accountee. This creates a form of accountability
wherein the social distance between accountor and accountee decreases. This is what
Roberts calls a form of face-to-face accountability that can have socializing effects
(Roberts 2001: 1567). The repeated dialogue between the two parties fosters trust
and cooperation and this may challenge explicit or implicit policy assumptions. Over
time, their repeated dialogue stimulates learning processes. In accordance with this
view it is clear that the different accountees all aim to formulate lessons for future
improvements.
In comparison to traditional forms of accountability, it is noteworthy that the
horizontal accountability processes evolve in relatively safe settings. As one director
of an agency notes: ‘It is not similar to meetings with the ministry, where I always go
with a slightly increased level of adrenaline. It’s not like that when I meet with the
board’. However, the dialogue is not devoid of tension either. Both parties
acknowledge—and notify this explicitly and usually without being asked directly
in the interviews—that the principal is a silent listener to their discussions. In some
instances, minutes of their meetings are sent to the minister and screened by his civil
servants. As one departmental respondent puts it: ‘I always listen carefully to what
the board has to say, because you know that the opinions [of board members] are
likely to recur later on’. In other instances, members of boards sometimes meet
formally or informally with the minister or senior ministerial officials. In these
circumstances, boards can serve as important ‘ambassadors’ to the cause of the
agency, or, in a less positive fashion, they can function as a ‘snitch’, as another
manager feared. And in still other instances, the outcomes of horizontal
accountability can and will be used by departmental personnel as monitoring
information. The ambiguity of the possible consequences adds tension to the
dialogue between accountor and accountee that circumvents the perils of a collusion
of interest.
Criterion 4: consequences
Processes of horizontal accountability can have different sorts of consequences for
agencies. It may directly influence policy decisions and may also work indirectly,
when the judgments and voice of the accountees activates other parties, such as the
ministry, a regulator or the media. And accountees may use formal sanctions, when
available. The different sorts of consequences were found in the investigated
agencies. In the observed cases there was some direct influence of horizontal
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accountability and there was some additional influence through the interaction with
the ‘shadow of hierarchy’.
Criterion 4a: formal sanctions
The only mechanisms for horizontal accountability with strong formal sanctions are
(most of the) boards of commissioners. Important powers that normally reside with
the minister have been partially transferred to these boards. These include budgetary
powers, the appointment and discharge of management, tariffs and the possibility to
lay down binding directives for operations. Boards address all major operations and
organizational strategies, just as boards of commissioners do in the ‘two tier system’
of the private sector.
During the interviews, managers and members of boards were asked how these
formal sanctions were used. The answers generally consisted off three parts. To
begin with, most of the respondents were able to point out which formal sanctions
were available to the board. This indicates that the sanctions were indeed important.
However, none of the respondents could remember a situation in which they were
actually used. The formal documents also did not uncover situations where sanctions
were applied. The respondents explained that the cooperative attitude of manage-
ments decreased the need to use formal sanctions. In addition, they also indicated
that the boards hardly ever promoted policies that differed strongly from the existing
policies. As one respondent noted: “they mostly strengthen what we already do, the
bandwidth of their views is not radically different”. This is a second reason why
formal sanctions are not used.
The fact that there are little formal sanctions and that the available sanctions are
not used might suggest that horizontal accountability had no influence on the
policies of the agencies. This suggestion is not correct. The research showed many
policy decisions that were influenced through horizontal accountability. Processes of
horizontal accountability generally have a clear, but somewhat modest, influence on
the decisions of agencies. For most of the agencies that were examined, it was
possible to find a number of specific decisions that were influenced by horizontal
accountability. Influence was acknowledged to exist when two independent
respondents together with ‘evidence’ from formal documents, such as minutes of
meetings, pointed in the same direction. For boards, most instances of influence
concerned improvements to systems of management or the relationship with the
ministry. For boards of stakeholders, instances of influence were mostly concerned
with specific aspects of services, and particularly communications with clients. The
influence of visitations is primarily directed towards transparency and responsive-
ness. Table 3 presents an overview of decisions and issues that were found to be
influenced by horizontal accountability.
The length of this table perhaps falsely suggests that horizontal accountability was
found to have a very strong direct influence on the decisions of agencies. But that is
not the case. Most listed items are decisions that can be taken without further
consequences for the overall policies of the agency. They are important to the system
or aspects of quality care, but can not be considered as major strategic changes.
Horizontal accountability was then found to have a clear influence on the agencies—
but also clearly less influence than hierarchical powers with stronger authorities. The
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fact, however, that all mechanisms at least did have some impact on agency-policies,
even without strong formal sanctions, can be understood through the ‘strength’ of
published voice and the policy networks of the different members.
Criterion 4b: informal consequences through published voice and voice in policy
networks
Horizontal accountability was found to have indirect consequences by activating the
ministry and the minister—or by the anticipation that this might happen. All
respondents indicated that they were aware of the fact that hierarchical actors might
and often did ‘listen’ to the dialogue between agencies and the different boards.
Departmental respondents stated that they scanned agenda’s, minutes, reports and
other evolving documents in order to trace ‘new developments’, ‘risks’ or ‘unwanted
policy interpretations’. Particularly the visitations showed several of these informal
consequences. This is the case because the resulting report is often used as input for
vertical accountability. Visitations are used by ministerial departments as forms of
fire alarm monitoring (McCubbins and Schwartz 1986). The visitation procedure is
highly public. The reports are published and the press write about the outcomes. This
is possible, because the process creates new and often highly informative
information on the agencies. This is due to the outspoken style of the evaluation
committee, the level of new information that is brought out through the self-
evaluations and the clear-cut evaluative perspective that is used. Through this all, the
process is always informative to outsiders. The visitation procedure therefore has
started to play a role that extends the confines of the relationship between agency
and visitation committee. Some reports have been discussed in the ministries. Some
Table 3 Decisions that were influence by horizontal accountability
Decisions
New chapter is added to
long term strategic plan
Analysis of media-sensitive issues Improvements in accessibility of
telephone services
Changes in policies for
whistle blowers
Consultation with unions Changes in format of research on
customer satisfaction
External accountant is
contacted
Changes in ICT-policies Changes in regulation of board of
stakeholders
Governance-code Veto on a specific estate-acquisition Increased organizational transparancy
Assessment of quality of
scientific outputs
Termination of an ‘expensive’ and
voluntary service
Boards of commissioners and
stakeholders were connected with
each other
Investigation in added
value of organisation
Many changes in brochures,
communications and formal letters
to clients
Board of stakeholders was connected
to organisations of local
stakeholders
Inventory of real estate A bureau for customer services is set
up
Changes in policies regarding
integrity
Check on bureau-costs in
international
benchmark
Clients who were negatively affected
by conflicting regulations were
helped
Communication
magazine
A new and improved
complaints policy
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ministers have drafted formal reactions and often it has lead to discussions between
parent-department and agency about specific outcomes. In one of the cases, the
permanent secretary of the parent-department did an unsuccessful attempt to prevent
the publication of the report. In another case it was agreed that the ministry was to
receive the draft-report before publication, which left some room for intervention.
The visitation thus adds to the monitoring capacity of the principal. Also, the voice
of the boards in particular was sometimes taken over by the ministry. One example is
where a board of stakeholders issues a public advice on the tariffs of an agency that
is subsequently adopted by the minister.
More important however than the question whether or not the ministry acts upon
the signals from horizontal accountability is the insight that the agencies were found
to anticipate this. Given that the boards are potential ambassadors of the
organisation, negative voice by boards in public or policy networks is clearly
unwanted. Ministerial respondents point out that this is exactly what they expect
horizontal accountability to accomplish. And furthermore, should for some reason a
negative voice evolve, they would certainly act upon it. As one respondent puts it: “I
assume that we would consider a negative voice from the board as a rather serious
signal. Given the fact that the organisation will try to prevent this to occur (…) so if
it does occur, then it needs to be taken really seriously”.
The ministerial respondents thus correctly expect that agencies try to prevent
negative conclusions in horizontal accountability. Loss of reputation and organiza-
tional legitimacy are important motivational factors in this respect. As Verhoest et al
(2007: 487) note, the possibility of sanctions creates a political pressure to adapt
policies and this can lead to innovative behaviour. Managers foster the legitimacy of
their organisation. They anticipate that negative news may lead to negative future
consequences.
Horizontal accountability is important in respect to the legitimacy and reputation
of agencies. Through horizontal accountability, agencies are able to build a coalition
of supporters. Carpenter (2001) showed how agencies actively look for support for
their policies and try to build networks in different important arenas. In the long run,
it is important that the agency has a political multiplicity, which means that it draws
support from a variety of proponents. This is a safer situation for the agency than the
situation where an agency is fully dependent on a single department, political party,
dominant interest group or segment of society. Horizontal accountability can be used
to build long-term constituencies. It can contribute to reputational uniqueness, which
means that the agency can demonstrate that it possesses skills and expertise that no
other agency or political actor can provide. Positive voice by a reputable third party,
boards or a visitation committee, is favourable from this perspective. Their support
strengthens the reputation of the agency and increases trust by political principals.
Discussion: learning in the shadow of hierarchy
In the first part of this paper it was indicated that horizontal accountability could
either be seen as a substitute for (or extension of) ministerial accountability or as
complement that stimulates learning. Now that horizontal accountability-in-action
has been described, it is time to evaluate our findings. As noted before, most
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commentators on new accountability mechanisms stress their relevance to
organizational learning, not the possibilities for ministerial control. The discussion
of horizontal-accountability-in-action in the preceding part clearly supports this
estimation.
There are several reasons why horizontal accountability—as it was found to
work—can not be seen as a potential substitute for ministerial responsibility. To
begin with, horizontal accountees do not act as deputies for the minister. None of the
board members referred to the ministry when asked about their roles. They do not
exert control on behalf of the ministry. As one of them stated firmly: “I am not here
to help the minister”. On many occasions quite the contrary happens when boards
(try to) direct the agency in opposing directions. Furthermore, these new
mechanisms do not create an alternative form of accountability to democratically
legitimized accountees. Particularly the representatives of stakeholders, who carry
the highest ‘democratic promise’, experience legitimacy problems. In some
occasions the representatives voiced opinions that conflict with those of the clients
they are supposed to represent. In some other instances, the boards had severe
difficulties finding ‘real’ clients who were willing to participate. This leads to a
situation that one observer sarcastically describes as: ‘we seem to be stuck with
professional clients only’.
For these reasons, horizontal accountability must be considered as something that
differs from the democratic control through ministerial responsibility. What
horizontal accountability adds, however, is that it stimulates the learning capacity
of agencies. The impact on learning starts in the information phase, where the
additional mechanisms create richness of information and new insights for the
people concerned. In the debating phase, accountors and accountees engage in
reflective dialogues aimed at policy improvements. The accountees do not use their
judgement as instruments of control. Rather, they try to formulate, as one respondent
noted: “operational lessons that help the agencies to improve”. These are socializing
forms of accountability that stimulate reflection and may over time lead to improved
services. The added value of these mechanisms is that they engage the insights and
knowledge of experienced peers or representatives of stakeholders. It is a form of
360°-accountability, as described by Behn (2001). Where stakeholders and experts
reflect on the policies of the agencies, this can be seen as feedback effects. Their
judgments are based on interests and priorities that differ from those of the ministry.
It is particularly noticeable that they are less driven by short term political
considerations and are more concerned with the quality of service over time. In that
respect, horizontal accountability is complementary to vertical control.
The learning processes through horizontal accountability take place in the
‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf 1997: 202). Scharpf has pointed out how ministers
influence decentralized decision-making between different government departments
or between employers and labour unions, without active personal interference and
even without knowing they do. This capacity stems from their ability to ratify the
agreements that decentralised parties agree upon. As the other parties know their
outcomes will or could be scrutinized by the minister, they will try to anticipate his
reactions. His anticipated veto points and preferences condition the possible
outcomes and actions of the involved parties. This way, the minister as an absent
party can nevertheless influence the processes and outcomes of horizontal
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exchanges. The same principle seems to apply to processes of horizontal
accountability. The shadow of the principal is cast on the relatively reciprocal
interactions between agencies and their boards and visitation committees. The
shadow of hierarchy strengthens and constrains these new arrangements.
The shadow of hierarchy strengthens horizontal accountability, as the relatively
‘weak’ mechanisms gain in influence through their connection with hierarchical
powers via published voice and their voice in policy networks. The respondents
from agencies all point out that they are aware of the possibility that the horizontal
interactions may have an impact—for better and for worse—in their vertical
relations. In the words of one respondent: “The members of the board are potential
ambassadors in important policy circles where we are not always present ourselves.”
This potential connection with policy networks brings a productive tension to their
dialogue, leads to some anticipative reactions by the agencies (in the sense of
Friedrich 1963: 200–4) and in general stimulates the agencies to treat board
members and visitations with much respect. Through this connection to the shadow
of hierarchy, the relatively powerless horizontal accountability arrangements attain
influence on many policy decisions of agencies (see Table 3).
However, the shadow of hierarchy also constrains the influence of horizontal
accountability. In the information phase, the same topics and issues are brought to
the attention of departmental overseers as well as to boards and visitation
committees. In vertical and horizontal accountability, the same issues are thus
treated, albeit from different perspectives. The respondents are very clear when
asked which of the different accountees is most influential on the same topics: the
parent department of course. The documentation that was studied points in the same
direction. This should not come as a surprise, as it is a logical consequence of the
fact that the investigated mechanisms all ascribe very limited sanctioning authorities
to the accountees. The possibilities to influence agencies directly are therefore
restricted. In addition, horizontal accountability is more of a cooperative dialogue
with management and is generally supportive of existing strategic choices. Boards
and councils use their position primarily to strengthen and improve the existing
policies, they have little inclination to change them in more fundamental ways as
ministries and politicians on the other hand repeatedly attempt to.
In situations of conflicting opinions between vertical and horizontal accountabil-
ity, the former naturally ‘wins’. In one case an agency was more or less forced by the
ministry to make a costly investment in real estate, even though it is formally its own
authority to make these decisions. The board of commissioners strongly opposed this
investment, as it was understood to be rather risky. The executive management
agreed with their assessment but indicated that it was not able to resist the ministry.
The possibilities of influence through horizontal accountability are constrained by
vertical accountability. If ministerial oversight is tight, the opportunities for
horizontal accountability to gain influence evaporate. This happened for instance
during the research when one agency became subject of a policy crisis that drew
close attention of the media, the ministry and politicians. During the crisis, which
lasted for about 6 months, the existing boards became more or less superfluous.
They had no impact on the proceedings or on the agency, as all of the respondents
note. And another agency suffers strong hierarchical controls on all budgetary
decisions. In effect, the board of commissioners has decided not to focus its
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oversight too strongly on the budget. A member of the board explains: “The annual
budget? ? We have little options there. The department and the agency spell out all
the details in advance; it’s like a moving train. So we do talk about the budget, but
not in much detail.”
In situations of tight vertical control, horizontal accountability has little effects
and could be seen as basically symbolic. The arrangements are added to the
accountability regime because they create the suggestion that the agencies take the
interests and opinions of stakeholders into account. But the extensive hierarchical
controls leave no serious room for influence. Particularly for the Dutch social
security agencies (UWV and CWI) this symbolic interpretation of horizontal
accountability comes to the fore. They are confronted with different councils of
clients with a high normative value because they should stimulate responsiveness to
clients and improvements in services. But in effect, they have very little influence on
the policies. As one critical departmental respondent notes: “You know, in political
debates, we all say that these client councils are of utmost importance. But to be
honest: I don’t see any real effects”.
For many of the other agencies, however, the distance between parent-department
and agency is larger and the arrangements have real effects. The symbolic
interpretation of horizontal accountability is only appropriate for a limited number
of cases. For the majority of cases, the relative distance of the parent-department
creates the room in which horizontal accountability stimulates learning processes.
The research showed that these new accountability arrangements have added value
because they are complementary to traditional accountability: they stand out by their
focus on reflective dialogue and learning.
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